Virtues of US-China ties mix signals to Asean

Outside the conference room, earlier at the APEC meeting in Manila, Obama continued to bolster his rebalanced policies towards Asia by providing US$250 million to improve maritime security capacity for Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. In this connection, at the summit here in KL, he also invited Asean leaders to meet in Washington next year to reinforce his Asean policy. He even boasted that he was the only US president to have met all the Asean leaders.

For the first time, the US supported Asean centrality in official bilateral documents for the first time. In the past, Washington often paid lip service to the concept, which acknowledged Asean’s leading role in the regional scheme of things.

In return, Asean made clear the importance of a US military presence in the region as a countervailing force against China. Deep down, it hoped the US would not hijack the South China Sea issue for itself, as Asean wants to retain its own narrative of the situation. At the level of official commitment, Obama’s strong leadership rapport helped the US obtain the status of strategic partner of Asean this year – along with New Zealand – joining China, Japan, South Korea, Australia and India.  

In a similar fashion, China has said it would continue to reclaim land under its territorial sovereignty, which has been the major bone of contention with Asean members. It said these facilities would be used for non-military purposes such as research on marine life and environment. Beijing also pledged to respect the freedom and safety of navigation and air flights in the South China Sea, as well as international law.

While conflicting Asean members blow hot and cold in their attitudes, China is promoting ferociously its transnational infrastructure pro?gramme known as “One Belt and One Road Initiative” throughout the region. Other proposals include the 2x7 programmes (2013) by Premier Li Keqiang and the 10-point proposal by Foreign Minister Wang Yi (2015). Currently, the super infrastructure initiative has been the main starter for any dialogue about future China-Asean relations.

At this juncture, only Malaysia has signed an MOU with China at the summit level. Indonesia, Thailand and Laos agreed to have China build their various railway networks.  As a group, Asean has yet to respond in detail about this initiative. The Masterplan of Asean Connection and China’s initiatives have overlapping areas, which need further clarification from the two countries.

Therefore, all the mixed signals from the world’s two great superpowers, as well as those from the grouping, must be seen and analysed with brutal realism. They serve the purpose of self-assurance from friends that is needed to counter growing anxiety and threat perception. They have more to do with symbolism than the desire for real action. Just look at all the recent activities and programmes proposed and undertaken by the US and China towards their friends and allies. In more ways than one, they are specifically aimed at countering one another’s growing security stakes and commitments in the region.

The continued outcries over China’s activities in the South China Sea have not in any way deterred Asean-China efforts to accelerate the process of drafting a code of conduct for the South China Sea, which has entered phase two, under the coordinator, Singapore. There is a high expectation that the CoC could be completed under Singapore’s leadership, which expires in 2018.

In more ways than one, Obama’s confidence in Xi’s remarks demonstrated his desire to place US-China relations in perspective, as well as allaying fears that the Southeast Asian nations might have had in their mutual recent tense exchanges between the US and China.

At the highest level, US-China rela?tions are balanced, stable and pre?dictable. In their latest meeting in Washington, they pledged closer cooperation in climate change, cybersecurity, missile technology and space, as well as action against violent extremists.

At the moment, there are lingering doubts about the longevity of the US commitment toward the region due to its current occupation with the current presidential campaign, counter terrorism and violent extremism and the Middle East crisis.

As far as South China Sea brinkmanship is concerned, all directly concerned parties, especially China and Asean, must understand the real meanings of these mixed signals and their limits. Otherwise, they could backfire and provide unwarranted justification for initiating or conducting extra programmes and activities that would further jeopardise the current situation.