Marawi is not our battle

One has to wonder what kind of thinking went into it before the Thai military decided it was ready and able to assist the Philippines army with the Marawi siege, an incident that could place the Kingdom in the loop with Islamic terrorists worldwide.
For three months now, the Philippines military has been battling militants affiliated with Islamic State (IS) in the city of Marawi in the Mindanao region.
There are foreign fighters in the militants’ line of command. But that’s not what made the fight difficult. Like many armed forces in the region, the Philippines’ was designed to fight conventional warfare, not urban guerrilla warfare as is being witnessed in Marawi.
Manila said the battle would end in a week’s time. But that was three months ago.
No one was certain who the Thai Army top brass consulted – or perhaps they felt they didn’t have to, since they are a bunch of experts already because of the uniform they wear – before announcing that they were ready to go to Marawi to lend Manila a helping hand.
But the Thai Army should realise that the battle in Marawi is a totally different kind of conflict compared to that in Thailand’s far South, Indonesia’s Aceh and East Timor. These conflicts are ethno-nationalist in nature, where the fighters are determined to carve out a separate homeland. The group in Marawi are affiliated with the Islamic State, and their conflict is global and ideological in nature. They are not fighting to carve out a historical homeland like the Moros in Mindanao or the Malays in Thailand’s southernmost provinces, but to spread fear with no regard to national borders or rules of engagement.
In fact, for many of these so-called new jihadists, death appears to be their fascination, and suicide attacks – not suicidal missions – appear to be the ultimate goal of their engagement.
Thailand has never faced this kind of enemy. The country’s military has been engaged in a 14-year-long separatist insurgency in the far South, but the militants there generally confine themselves to the Malay-speaking area. 
They have attacked outside of this region once in a long while, just to make a point to the Thais about their capabilities. But, unlike Islamic State, mass casualties don’t appear to be their aim.
Humanitarian initiatives are a good thing, but they should be left to the proper agencies, not the military. If Thailand wants to help the Philippines with humanitarian aid, then the Army is the last agency that should be sent. Why not work with civil society organisations or medical professionals on this matter?
There are many foreign fighters on the ground and if Thailand is seen as getting directly involved, Muslim extremists from IS will not need an invitation to enter Thailand to carry out terrorist attacks.
The terrorist attack at the  Ratchaprasong intersection two years ago is a case in point. If the popular understanding and official explanation of the attack is to be believed, then the attack was a harsh lesson resulting from a misguided decision that involved the forced repatriation of over 100 Uighurs back to China without thinking about the consequences – which, of course, were deadly.
Is the Thai Army hard-up for brownie points? If so, shouldn’t it try harder to change the paradigm for the conflict in the far South where nearly 7,000 people, mostly local Muslims, have been killed?
With the military fully in charge of the country’s governance, the initial thinking was that the implementation of strategies and initiatives on the ground would be more efficient. Unfortunately, that hasn’t been the case. This is because the junta is not willing to make the needed concessions to change the course of the conflict.
Instead of making thoughtful decisions for the country’s far South, the Army would rather be somebody else’s backup singer so it can get some brownie points. In its view, there is no harm done. And if it gets too hot, they can always leave Marawi anytime.